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Is There a Rational Justification for Punishing an 
Accomplished Crime More Severely than an 
Attempted Crime? A Comment on Prof. Dr. Bjorn 
Burkhardt's Paper* 
Dr. Mordechai Kremnitzer** 
At the outset of his paper, Professor Burkhardt enumerates the 
problems facing the researcher who examines the question whether ac-
complished crimes should be distinguished from attempted crimes for 
the purpose of punishment. 1 In the wake of Burkhardt's excellent and 
comprehensive article, the problems of arriving at an unambiguous, sat-
isfactory answer and raising new arguments are greatly increased. The 
following is devoted to the claim that it is possible to present a justifica-
tion, more forcefully than Burkhardt did, for distinguishing between 
the punishment of accomplished crimes and the punishment of at-
tempts. However, I would first like to make a number of observations 
concerning the nature and the characteristics of the question. 
First, what makes the question at hand so captivating is the ap-
parent gap between the socio-legal consciousness and the conclusions 
that arise from a rational examination of the penal considerations. A 
rational, or psychoanalytical, examination yields a conclusion that fa-
vors making no distinction in the penal response between accomplished 
crimes and attempts. Yet many people2 and, indeed, many legal sys-
tems,3 tend to distinguish between the two with regard to punishment. 
• A first draft of this comment was presented to the German Anglo-American Workshop 
organized by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg 
on the 19th of July 1984. I am grateful to the Workshop's participants for their remarks. 
Burkhardt's paper to the Workshop, together with the other papers of the German participants, 
was published in 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 553 (1986). Although this comment is related to 
Burkhardt's article, it can also be read independently. 
•• Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law. The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
I. Burkhardt, Is There a Rational justification for Punishing an Accomplished Crime More 
Severely than an Attempted Crime?, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 553 (1986). 
2. For example, raising this question before my students in two criminal law classes (one 
class of law students and one of criminology students) yielded a finding that 80% were of the 
opinion that the penalty for attempt should be distinguished from the penalty for the accomplished 
crime. Carr reports a similar tendency; see Carr, Punishing Attempts, 62 PAC. PHIL. Q. 61, 62 
(1981) 
3. For example, English common law and other legal systems inspired by English law, such 
81 
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Some are of the opinion that it is impossible to reconcile current theo-
ries of penal objectives with the traditional distinction between the pun-
ishment of accomplished crimes and attempts and who therefore hold 
that "either the theories are unsatisfactory or our practices should be 
changed. "4 
The approach that distinguishes accomplished crimes from at-
tempts may, perhaps, be explained as follows: First, results generally 
influence our viewpoint and our judgment in daily life,11 politics and 
historical analysis6 ; and, second, historical criminal law influences the 
social consciousness. 7 Early criminal law considered results because it 
replaced the "private" law of revenge and taking the law into one's 
own hands, which by their nature centered upon the negative results of 
criminal conduct.8 Of course, this early approach changed with the 
gradual recognition of other grounds for criminal responsibility, such as 
the mental element, but it has not entirely disappeared and remains 
firmly rooted in the normative system of the criminal law. Today, as in 
the past, this approach influences society's evaluations, intuitions and 
judgment.9 
In addition, the importance of the question under discussion de-
pends, to a great extent, upon the degree of leeway that the law gives to 
the process of individualizing punishment, that is, to the normative 
framework of the penalty established for an offense. In a legal system 
that provides only, or primarily, maximum penalties, distinguishing at-
tempts from accomplished crimes is less significant than in a system 
that provides both maximum and minimum penalties. The question as-
sumes its greatest significance in a system of fixed penalties, especially 
severe ones, such as death and mandatory life imprisonment. Further-
more, our question's primary significance extends beyond its seemingly 
narrow limits. It includes the issue of the scope of punishment of at-
tempt (for example, if attempt is not to be distinguished from the ac-
as Israeli, Canadian and New Zealand law, require leniency in the punishment of attempts; Ger-
man, Swiss and Japanese law allow for leniency in the case of attempt. 
4. Dworkin & Blumenfeld, Punishment for Intentions, 75 MIND 396, 404 (1966); but see 
Marshall, Punishment for Intentions, 80 MIND 597 (1971). 
5. See B. WILLIAMS, MoRAL LucK 22, 23 (1981 ). 
6. Compare in this regard the effect upon the public consciousness in the free world of the 
successful Entebbe hostage rescue to the effect of the unsuccessful attempt to free American hos-
tages held in Teheran. 
7. See generally Marshall, supra note 4. 
8. See Exodus 21:17-23; see also Marshall, supra note 4, at 597-98. 
9. In a discussion held in my class on the question of the distinction, for example, many 
students offered the "reason" that "the law distinguishes attempts from accomplished crimes with 
respect to penalty." 
81] RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION? 83 
complished crime, should the scope of its punishment be limited ?). 10 
The question also raises the issue of the place and status of results in 
the criminal law, including its implications for the laws of negligence 
and accessories. In approaching the question, we must also consider 
such fundamental issues as the place and importance of the mental ele-
ment in crime, the nature and purpose of punishment and penal law, 
and the relationship between law and morality. In this context, we 
should note that with Burkhardt's approach, which distinguishes be-
tween successful and unsuccessful attempts, danger-and not its chance 
realization-is the basis for attributing criminal responsibility. Burk-
hardt's is not the only approach that rejects making the realization of 
results a yardstick in criminal law. Another approach views the mental 
attitude of the perpetrator as the "end all," and thus does not distin-
guish between the creation of the danger (i.e., possible attempt) and an 
absence of danger (i.e., impossible attempt). 11 
Moreover, as stated earlier, it is arguable that in this matter our 
intuitions are influenced by legal reality. Nevertheless, these intuitions 
should be empirically investigated by an examination of the penalties 
imposed by the courts and the reasoned opinions of a cross section of 
the public. 12 Through such an examination we may hope to discover 
the underlying criteria (mental element, degree of danger, etc.) and the 
generality and consistency of approach to the various mental elements 
and different offenses. 13 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the response to the question 
may be influenced by its phrasing. Consider, for example, the differ-
ence between: Is it justified to punish an accomplished crime more se-
verely than an attempt? and: Is it justified to punish attempt less se-
verely than an accomplished crime ?14 Similarly, differences in approach 
may arise with regard to partially successful attempts (e.g., the victim is 
wounded), as opposed to unsuccessful completed attempts (e.g., all the 
bullets missed the victim). 
10. In this respect, English law, which punished attempted felonies and misdemeanors, dif-
fers from German law, under which only attempted felonies are punishable, while attempted mis-
demeanors are only punishable if so specified in the Code. 
11. Stratenwerth, Handlunqs und Erfolgsunwert im Strafrecht, 79 ScHw. ZEITS. F. 
STRAFR. 16 (1963). 
12. It would be interesting to examine to what extent intuition is influenced by the legal 
system in force. 
13. It is possible that greater importance would be assigned to the result of less severe of-
fenses (e.g., theft) in comparison to more severe offenses (e.g., causing bodily harm and murder). 
14. The approach requiring equal penalties for attempts and accomplished crimes does not 
necessarily mandate that penalties for attempts be raised; the goal could also be achieved by lower-
ing the penalties for accomplished crimes. Moreover, if it is held that the result is entirely a matter 
of chance, one method of evaluation is to disregard that result. 
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I will now address the question itself and attempt to show that an 
approach that distinguishes between the punishment of accomplished 
crimes and the punishment of attempted crimes can be justified. I begin 
by considering the claim that rational judgment must disregard differ-
ences born of chance. 
I. RATIONALITY, CHANCE AND THE PUNISHMENT OF ATTEMPT 
The issue of chance may be discussed in light of the following 
propositions: 
A. Moral judgment does not disregard the element of chance. 
B. Judgment in criminal law is not identical to moral judgment, 
and the evaluation of chance differences is not foreign to judgment in 
criminal law. 
C. The difference between an accomplished offense and an at-
tempt to commit that offense is not one of chance. 
A. Chance and Moral judgment 
One of the strongest arguments in favor of a nondifferentiating 
approach is that the opposite, differentiating, approach makes punish-
ment conditional in a manner not consistent with the rational approach. 
Thus, proponents of a rational approach would argue that moral values 
are immune to luck and are not dependent upon it, or in the words of 
Bernard Williams: "Anything which is the product of happy or un-
happy contingency is no proper object of moral assessment, and no 
proper determinant of it either."111 This idea reflects a basic sense that 
is deeply rooted in our moral judgment system. Nonetheless, we should 
bear in mind that a decision to act-including a decision to perpetrate 
an offense-and the carrying out of such a decision are often contingent 
upon fortuitous circumstances, such as temptation, provocation, and 
abetment (not to mention such chance factors as heredity and environ-
ment which may also influence moral disposition). An insistence upon 
the absolute disregard of chance factors makes moral judgement almost 
impossible. 16 In practice, we make moral judgments notwithstanding 
the influence of chance factors. 
Moreover, it would seem that our moral sense is not affronted 
even if a difference in attitude is founded upon a chance distinction. 
Consider the following: two men are provoked in an extreme manner. 
Experience shows that their immediate reaction to such provocation is 
one of violent outburst. But this time, one of them gets something in his 
15. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 20. 
16. /d. at 21. 
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eye, and in the course of removing the foreign object he cools off. His 
friend, not similarly detained, seriously injures his provoker. Our ten-
dency is to distinguish the two in moral terms, not merely in terms of 
legal judgment. Another example is our reaction to a successful thief 
who makes off with a fortune, as opposed to our reaction to a less 
successful thief who finds but a trifle. 17 Both thieves may have intended 
to take whatever they might find, and it was only the hand of fate that 
brought one a treasure and the other a mere pittance. As the ancient 
Hebrew saying goes: "Everything in the world depends on fortune, 
even the scroll of the Law in the Temple." Though it be difficult to 
accept and disconcerting, it is an inescapable reality. 
B. Moral judgment and judgment in Criminal Law 
Even were moral judgments entirely free of the factor of chance, 
we would, nevertheless, have to examine whether moral judgment and 
criminal law judgment are one and the same. Do moral judgments 
serve as our sole and supreme criteria, or does this granting of exclusiv-
ity and unlimited application to "purely moral motivations" bring 
about what Williams describes as "no life of one's own, except perhaps 
for some small area, hygienically allotted, of meaningless privacy"?18 
Whatever the case may be in the realm of personal judgment, 
purely moral judgment and judgment in the sphere of criminal law are 
not congruent. 19 The difference between the two derives from the pur-
pose of criminal law, which is first and foremost the defense of those 
interests necessary to the existence and development of society, and not 
the total adoption of moral norms and their transformation into norms 
of criminal law by the appending of sanctions. The primary function of 
moral judgment within the criminal law framework is to filter and de-
limit criminal responsibility; this as distinct from obliging or justifying 
the assignment of criminal responsibility. The norms of criminal law, 
whose purpose is to safeguard vital societal interests, must also be 
moral norms. But a moral transgression that does not threaten a socie-
tal interest need not be a crirnmal offense. In the absence of moral 
blameworthiness, there should be no punishment, though moral blame-
worthiness in and of itself does not justify punishment. Punishment 
should not be meted out in excess of what is warranted by our moral 
sense, though we need not reach the upper limit of punishment toler-
ated by that moral sense. For example, even if we hold that there is no 
17. Consider another example: two bank robl:oers are "surprised," one by an unexpected 
withdrawal, the other by an extraordinary unforeseen deposit. 
18. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 38. 
19. It is not my intention to treat this complex issue exhaustively or comprehensively. 
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moral difference between a successful offender and one whose purpose 
is thwarted by circumstances beyond his control, there can be little 
doubt that there is a significant difference between the two in the eyes 
of the criminal law. Though numerous examples of this proposition 
might be advanced, a few should suffice. 
Consider the case of a nephew designing his uncle's death. To at-
tain his intended purpose, the nephew sends his uncle for a walk in the 
woods on a stormy night or books him a flight on an airline of ques-
tionable repute. Although the nephew's evil intent in no way differs 
from that of a murderer, still he will not be held criminally responsible 
for his uncle's death. 20 Morally, there is no difference between an un-
realistic attempted murder (such as by absurd means, where the perpe-
trator is aware of the physical quality of his actions, e.g., magic or 
prayer) and any other attempts, though the former is not subject to 
criminal sanction. The criminal law similarly treats conduct fortui-
tously interrupted in its preparatory stage, though but a single step 
remains in putting that preparation into effect (in the case of prepara-
tion that is not itself unlawful). Yet the same conduct, if not inter-
rupted, becomes a punishable attempt with the taking of that single 
step. If we distinguish between complete and incomplete attempts (e.g., 
with respect to punishment), we introduce still another distinction that 
may result from chance. The ability to take that additional step that 
distinguishes the completed attempt from the incomplete attempt de-
pends, inter alia, upon the non-intervention of the police at the critical 
stage. Such is also the case with possible-as opposed to impossi-
ble-attempts, since success and failure are often dependent on chance 
(e.g., the intended victim dies a natural death an instant before an at-
tempt is made on his life). 
Likewise, the criminal responsibility of accomplices is not always 
in accord with our moral sense. Morally, there is no difference between 
aiding a person who commits an accomplished crime and aiding a per-
son who does not actually commit the planned offense, though the 
criminal law may assign responsibility only for the former. 
Legal provisions which allow for retreat from an attempt and non-
punishment in the case of retreat make for yet another distinction: they 
distinguish an offender who retreats from one who does not enjoy the 
opportunity. For example, an incited person zealously carries out the 
offense before the repentant inciter can dissuade him; or the victim re-
turns home earlier than expected and sets off the bomb while the per-
petrator is on his way to disarm it. 
20. This, at least, is the position of German law; see C. RoXIN, HoNIG-FESTSCHRIFT 135. 
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Classifying offenses in terms of their relative severity (death, bod-
ily harm, theft, etc.) reflects, above all, the relative societal importance 
of the various interests defended by the legal prohibitions. While, on 
the other hand, the differences in the importance of the protected inter-
est create differences in the severity of the mental attitude of the 
perpetrators. 
C. Success of the Accomplished Crime and Failure of the At-
tempt-A Matter of Chance? The Factor of Individual Deterrence 
A primary assumption of our discussion up to this point has been 
that the factor differentiating a completed attempt from an accom-
plished crime is chance. This is indeed the ineluctable conclusion to be 
drawn from the comparison of individual situations. However, it may 
be assumed that an examination of all the cases of success and failure 
would show that they generally differ as follows: among the cases of 
success we will find more instances of careful planning and high-level 
performance than among the cases of failure. Conceivably, more and 
more of the factors upon which success depends can be controlled by 
the perpetrator through appropriate planning and competent perform-
ance. Thus, the margins of uncertainty and the probability of failure 
can be lessened. Among the factors that may improve the chances of a 
murder, for example, we might mention physical control of the victim, 
isolated location, lethality of the means (a knife as opposed to bare 
hands, a rifle as opposed to a knife, a high-caliber automatic weapon 
with a telescopic sight and ample ammunition as opposed to a rifle), 
expertise in the use of the chosen means, repeated use at close range, 
and guarantee of the results. Indeed, according to the findings of Frank 
Zimring, "[ t ]he rate of knife deaths per 100 reported knife attacks was 
less than 1/5 the rate of gun deaths per 100 gun attacks."21 It is possi-
ble to imagine a continuum where well-planned and performed suc-
cesses stand at one end and poorly-planned and performed failures 
stand at the other, while in between are those instances in which the 
correlation between the quality of planning and performance and the 
degree of success or failure is less clear. The result of such an approach 
would be that we might view the failure of an attempt as a substantial 
indicator of the failure in the planning or performance and, therefore, 
as an indication that the perpetrator posed a lesser threat than his suc-
cessful counterpart. This consideration of the potential danger 
21. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killing? 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 728 
(1967/1968); see also Zimring, The Medium is the Message: Firearm Caliber a Determinant of 
Death from Assault, I J. LEGAL STUD. 97, I 05 ( 1972). 
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presented by the perpetrator is significant in the context of individual 
deterrence as an object of punishment. 
When the above factors are not considered, it is generally felt that 
there is no justification for distinguishing accomplished crimes from at-
tempts for the purpose of punishment. However, where offenses carry-
ing fixed penalties are concerned, the difference in potential danger be-
tween the attempter and the successful perpetrator can justify 
distinguishing between the two. Whether a similar distinction would be 
justified with regard to other offenses would seem to depend on how 
strong the correlation is between the elements of planning and perform-
ance and those of success and failure. The empirical data gathered to 
date are not sufficient for a decision. Zimring's studies did not focus 
upon perpetrators acting with intent to bring about a result, nor did 
they consider all the factors that contribute to the probability of success, 
such as the range from which the weapon was used and the degree of 
the perpetrator's expertise in the handling of the weapon. That con-
trary examples (excellent plans that failed and questionable plans that 
succeeded) exist does not preclude at least a facultative consideration of 
a sufficiently clear correlate. Legal distinctions in the matter of punish-
ment are, after all, generally based upon the common cases and are not 
dependent upon absolute accuracy as expressed by appropriateness in 
every imaginable case. 22 Thus we may conclude that the consideration 
of individual deterrence does not necessarily oblige equal punishment of 
accomplished crimes and attempts. 
II. RETRIBUTION 
The other central consideration justifying equality in the punish-
ment of attempts and accomplished crimes is that of retribution. In 
terms of retribution, there is no difference between the moral blame-
worthiness of the successful perpetrator and the attempter, at least in 
the case of a completed attempt. Indeed, it must be admitted that if we 
do not take account of the subconscious and base ourselves upon a pre-
mise of retribution for moral blameworthiness, then there is no place 
for a distinction between the cases. However, moral blameworthiness is 
not the sole basis for retribution. The following presents other 
possibilities. 
22. Thus, for example, a distinction is justified between (1) the penalties for active conduct 
that brings about a result and for passive conduct that brings about the same result through a 
breach of a legal duty, and (2) primary offenders and accessories. However, there may be cases 
where it is justified to make the penalties for omission or aid equal to those for commission or 
primary conduct. 
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A. Retribution as Social Censure 
Social censure is another basis for retribution. If the retributive 
approach is apprehended as one seeking to express social censure of the 
act (an approach closer to the historical view of retribution),23 then the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of the result may properly be taken into 
account, because it is a factor that influences the extent and intensity of 
society's reaction to the act. 24 
B. The Retributive Approach Based upon the Concept of the Social 
Contract 
According to the social contract approach developed by Herbert 
Morris,211 obedience to penal norms is based upon "moral equilibrium" 
between benefits and burdens. The benefits are expressed as "non-in-
terference by others with what each person values, such matters as con-
tinuance of life and bodily security."26 The benefits are dependent upon 
the "assumption of burdens," where "the burden consists of the exer-
cise of self-restraint by individuals at a point where, were they not to 
exercise it, others would in the normal course of events be harmed."27 
In this light, "if a person fails to exercise self-restraint even though he 
might have, he relinquishes a burden which others have voluntarily as-
sumed and thus gains an advantage which others, who have restrained 
themselves, do not possess."28 In such a case, the equilibrium is vio-
lated, and re-establishing it requires deprivation of the benefit unlaw-
fully acquired. If this is not done, others will have no interest in exer-
cising self-restraint, and the system will collapse. 
According to this approach, "the consummator owes more because 
he has taken and acquired more. He has not just the satisfaction at-
tendant upon relinquishing the burden of self-restraint, but he has the 
satisfaction attendant upon realization of his desires. "29 One who has 
stolen successfully benefits more than one who has failed to achieve the 
same objective, and the penalty must reflect the excess benefit enjoyed 
by the successful, as opposed to the unsuccessful, thief. The same con-
clusion is reached if we focus upon the harm caused society by that 
23. j. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95 (1970); Hart, Criminal Punishment as Pub-
lic Condemnation in CoNTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT 12 (R. Gerber & P. McAnany eds. 1972). 
24. j. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
153, 154 (2d ed. 1823). 
25. H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 126 (1976). 
26. /d. at 126. 
27. /d. at 126-27. 
28. /d. at 127. 
29. /d.; see Carr, supra note 2, at 63 (emphasis added). 
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unlawfully gained benefit. The extent of the harm caused is propor-
tional to the extent of the benefit gained by the perpetrator, and in 
order to restore equilibrium, the penalty must correspond to the degree 
of harm caused. 
From the foregoing, we may conclude that in terms of the retribu-
tive approach as well, a distinction between the punishment of attempts 
and the punishment of accomplished crimes is justifiable. 
III. UTILITARIAN CoNSIDERATIONS 
A. General Deterrence 
In utilitarian terms, leniency in the treatment of attempt does not 
undermine the deterrent and preventative value of the penalty. A per-
son entertaining the possibility of committing a criminal offense views 
his planned conduct from the perspective of success and not of failure 
and arrest. Therefore, the penalty for attempt, as distinguished from 
the penalty for the accomplished crime, bears no significance in the 
decision whether to commit a crime or to refrain from commission. Pre-
vention must be acquired at the lowest possible cost, or in the words of 
Bentham, "at as cheap a rate as possible."30 This because "punishment 
... is in itself an expense: it is itself an evil."31 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above two considerations is 
that the penalty for attempted crime should be reduced as much as pos-
sible without hampering the function of deterring the individual of-
fender, after the fact, from repeating his criminal conduct. 
Burkhardt conjectures that "this argument for more lenient pun-
ishment will hardly convince anyone who is not already, for other rea-
sons, convinced of its correctness."32 In my opinion, Burkhardt's state-
ment is an inadequate evaluation of the argument. The assertion that 
there is a "deficiency in the verification of its empirical premises"38 is 
correct, but its significance is limited. After all, the same argument can 
be raised with regard to virtually every proposition in the field of gen-
eral deterrence. On its face, the proposition seems quite reasonable 
that, in general (with the exception of particularly cunning economic 
offenses), the scenario of failure and arrest is not foremost in the mind 
of the person planning the commission of an offense. 
Schulhofer's assertion, cited with approval by Burkhardt, is also 
not immune to critical appraisal. The assertion is that "from a deter-
30. J. BENTHAM, supra note 24 at 178. 
31. /d. at 179. 
32. Supra note 1, at 571. 
33. !d. at 570. 
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renee perspective, the frugality approach requires acceptance of the 
very troublesome position that general deterrence, unsupported by other 
goals, can be the sole rationale for an additional sanction .... " 34 This 
assertion is based upon a retributive theory according to which "offend-
ers should be punished with severity corresponding to the moral gravity 
of their offense." 311 However, as Schulhofer himself admits, few support 
such a retributive theory,36 and the majority views retribution as an 
upper limit to penalty. Within the bounds of penalties possible in terms 
of retribution, utilitarian considerations come into play, among them 
general deterrence. Where the penalty does not deviate from that justi-
fied by retribution (and as stated, the distinction between attempt and 
accomplished crime is justifiable in retributive terms), general deter-
rence is not the sole rationale for an additional sanction.37 What is con-
cerned is a utilitarian consideration that justifies reducing the penalty 
for attempts where the penalty for the completed offense does not devi-
ate from that flowing from the retributive element. 
As for any claimed harm to the principle of equality that may be 
perceived in a differential approach to attempts and accomplished 
crimes, the relationship between the penal objectives and considerations 
and the principle of equality is too complex to be treated at any length 
within the framework of this paper.38 However, if by equality we mean 
that sense of equality that we perceive in reality (as opposed to norma-
tive, ideal, or abstract equality), we doubt whether the public would 
view a differentiating approach as being unequal or discriminatory. (It 
may be assumed that a non-differentiating approach would be consid-
ered to be unjustified in granting equal treatment to non-equals.) Even 
when viewed from the perspective of the offenders themselves, it is not 
altogether clear that the differential approach would be considered un-
just. This would appear to be so, owing to the stronger sense of guilt 
(as opposed to moral blameworthiness) in the case of success. 39 Accord-
ing to this approach, the sense of guilt is not a direct consideration in 
the setting of the penalty, but it is a relevant consideration in negating 
the fear of any perceived inequality arising from the distinction be-
tween the punishment of attempts and accomplished crimes. 
As for Burkhardt's reliance on the fact that this claim has been 
34. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct 
in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1581 (1974). 
35. /d. at 1571 (emphasis added). 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 1575. 
38. Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, SENTENCING 257 (H. Gross & A. von 
Hirsch eds. 1981 ); see Schulhofer, supra note 34, at 1569. 
39. H. MoRRIS, supra note 25, at 120. 
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unsuccessfully advanced for two hundred years, it is doubtful whether 
this is a strong argument against its validity. Moreover, we cannot 
know to what extent the claim has influenced those legal systems that 
do distinguish attempts from accomplished crimes. 
In terms of the effect of the penalty actually enforced (as distinct 
from the effect of the penalty established in the law) on the level of 
general deterrence, the dramatic element is generally greater in trials 
for accomplished crimes than in trials for attempts. Thus, there is 
greater curiosity, interest and effect in trials of the former kind, and 
therefore the influence, too, is greater. This supports, to some extent, 
the claim that there is nothing to fear from mitigating the penalty for 
attempt with respect to general deterrence. 
B. Lowering the Penalty for Attempt as an Incentive to Desist 
In the opinion of the law faculty of Frankfurt upon Oder, we find 
a consideration of the possibility that equal penalties for attempts and 
accomplished crimes may, in certain circumstances, prevent the perpe-
trator from desisting from his conduct."0 This possibility is difficult to 
deny. In fact, the contrary claim does not deny the possibility itself, but 
detracts from its importance. The contrary claim is that the possibility 
that equal punishment prevents the perpetrator from desisting only sur-
faces and is only effective, ·in but a small number of cases. Thus H.L.A. 
Hart writes: "Such cases are, of course, realities; but they are surely 
very rare, if only because in the law of most systems in order to be 
guilty of an attempt one has to get very near to the completion of the 
full offense and the questions of a second shot may arise only 
sekiom. "41 
Without taking a firm stand on the matter, it may still be asserted 
that there is some room for doubt as to the correctness of Hart's estima-
tion of the rarity of the phenomena. As for Hart's first premise, it is 
correct that attempt must approach the relevant conduct, but not, neces-
sarily, completion of the crime (as, for example, in the case of poisoning 
in stages). At least in English law, there has been a change since the 
above argument was advanced, and the area of attempt now extends to 
conduct that goes beyond the preparatory stage.42 As for the second 
premise, Zimring's findings show that "in 72 percent of all non-fatal 
firearms attacks the offender did not inflict more than one wound, in 
spite of his ordinary ability to do so."43 Zimring is of the opinion that 
40. Burkhardt, supra note 1, at 556. 
41. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 130 (1968). 
42. Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, ch. 1 § I. 
43. Zimring, The Medium is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from 
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"while there is evidence that the objective of a serious attack is ambigu-
ous at the outset and remains so throughout its course, there is also 
some indication that the desired result of an attack may very well 
change during its enactment." This is so, Zimring continues, because 
"firing a shot that finds its mark can be an emotional release" and 
because "inflicting a wound has transformed the consequences of as-
sault from the realm of fantasy to that of palpable and unpleasant real-
ity; if the reality of deadly attack does not square with its fantasy sig-
nificance ... the attack may be aborted .... "44 The extent of the 
chances of influencing the attempter to desist though a mitigation of the 
penalty is another question. The members of the Frankfurt law faculty 
offered this opinion: "A legislative enactment which, in itself and in its 
structure and application induces and creates the possibility of an ac-
tual murder even in one out of a thousand cases, is an enactment 
which always will be incompatible with legal philosophy."'11 
To my mind, the members of the Frankfurt law faculty are cor-
rect. In a situation where a perpetrator has reached a crossroad (the 
need to continue firing in order to kill his victim, or to take up a knife 
to finish the job), powerful forces may drive him to proceed toward the 
attainment of his objective. Among these driving forces are his original 
objective, the possibility that the steps already taken have brought him 
so close to fulfillment that he is propelled by inertia, the wish to rid 
himself of the victim (in the case of homicide) and the possibility that 
the victim may testify against him. Making the penalty for the attempt 
equal to the penalty for the accomplished crime in such a situation is 
tantamount to adding an incentive to carry out the deadly objective. 
Even if the influence of a distinction in penalty be small, we must not 
concede it where a person's life or another important interest may be at 
stake. 
It should be noted that an offender may act to prevent the results 
of his conduct even after completing the attempt (e.g., by aiding an 
injured victim and by taking steps to save him). Even at this stage, the 
distinction between the punishment of attempts and that of accom-
plished crimes may exert some influence. Clearly, this consideration is 
more important in legal systems that do not recognize retreat from an 
attempt as conduct that discharges the offender from penalty, though 
even in systems that do recognize retreat, the distinction is important in 
those cases where the retreat is not voluntary. 
We have already mentioned the consideration of distinguishing be-
Assault, I J. LEGAL STUD. 97, Ill ( 1972). 
44. /d. at 112. 
45. Burkhardt, supra note I, at 556 (emphasis added). 
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tween attempts and accomplished crimes in terms of inherent danger 
and the consequences for individual deterrence. In light of our findings 
concerning general deterrence and the above discussion of retreat and 
the incentive to desist, it would appear that it is possible to justify dis-
tinguishing attempt from accomplished crime in terms of utility. 
III. DISTINGUISHING ATTEMPTS FROM ACCOMPLISHED CRIMES 
FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES 
The distinction under discussion can also be justified as a symbolic 
expression, or reminder, of the primary function of criminal law, that is 
the defense of vital societal interests. This function is at the root of 
punishing attempts and offenses which create danger. In an imaginary 
world in which all attempts and potential dangers do not ripen into 
forbidden results, there is no point in punishing such offenses.46 A legal 
system that does not distinguish attempts from accomplished crimes 
runs the risk that this basic orientation concerning the purpose of the 
criminal law may be forgotten or blurred, only to be supplanted by a 
conception of the criminal law as the normative expression of morality. 
Since punishment is a practical matter as well as a symbolic one, 
there must, of course, be some other justification for the distinction, in 
addition to the symbolic or educational concern. This additional justifi-
cation can be found in the other considerations already discussed. To 
these considerations we may add yet another-one of Burkhardt's own: 
"the function of criminal law cannot be adequately grasped through the 
concept of the motivationally-related imperative norm."47 
The criminal norm is also an "evaluation norm" (Bewertung-
snl'rm ), an "instrument of settlement." It follows, therefore, that the 
evaluation expressed by the norm should relate to a greater injury to 
society in the case of an accomplished offense-both in the concrete 
terms of an injury to a material object or a direct injury to a protected 
interest, as well as in the abstract sense of greater harm to the social 
fabric and the socio-legal order (i.e., a stronger sense of fear and inse-
curity within the society and a greater mistrust in the factual validity of 
the specific norm and the legal order as a whole). The additional sever-
ity of the accomplished crime justifies increased severity of penalty, just 
as severity in punishment is justified by other considerations of the se-
verity of the harm caused (as where the particularly great emotional 
trauma suffered by the victim of rape justifies more severe punishment 
46. It may be appropriate to punish for offenses with respect to the degree of fear caused, 
though the character and weight of this reason differ entirely from the reasons that justify the 
punishment of offenses. 
47. Burkhardt, supra note I, at 562. 
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of that form of assault)!8 
Yet another educational consideration is that a non-differentiation 
approach may be viewed or interpreted49 as being unconcerned with 
the plight of the victim and indifferent to his fate. Such an approach 
undermines the importance of the protected social values represented by 
the victim of the offense. 
IV. A CoNCLUSION-BUT NoT THE END 
Does this approach reflect a firm conviction in the justification of 
differentiating accomplished crimes from attempts? Not necessarily, 
and an expression of the problematic character of the issue can be 
found in the Israeli draft for the general part of a new Criminal Law. 
The draft offers two alternative provisions, reflecting both approaches, 
in the matter of punishing attempt (sec. 27). One suggestion is that the 
penalty established for the accomplished offense " ... be greater than 
that established for attempts." The other suggestion is that the penalties 
for attempts and accomplished crimes be identical. 
In any event, it is my belief that in the matter of making the pun-
ishment of attempts equal to that of the accomplished crime, the burden 
of proof rests upon the shoulders of those who urge more severe pun-
ishment of attempt}10 To date, that burden has not been met. 
But has the debate surrounding this issue progressed significantly 
over the years? I am not at all certain that it has. Plato's position was 
that: 
One who has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his 
enemy and whom the law does not permit him to slay and he wounds 
him, but is unable to kill him should be regarded as a murderer and 
be tried for murder. But from respect for "fortune" and "providence" 
and as a "thank offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his 
will" the death penalty should not be remitted and banishment for 
life, together with compensation for the injury, substituted.61 
In comparing Plato's view to our modern examinations, one gets the 
feeling that we are faced by an insoluble riddle. 
48. I have assumed that the emotional harm caused in this case is covered (at least generally) 
by the perpetrator's awareness, just as there may be contemplation of this possibility in the case of 
rape when no special emotional harm was caused the victim. This approach is a variation of the 
view expressed by Herbert Morris, presented supra text accompanying note 25. 
49. May be interpreted even if the interpretation does not accurately reflect the approach, 
which rather seeks to emphasize the importance of the protected interest (though it does not miss 
the mark when leniency is urged for the accomplished crime because the chance element of the 
occurrence of the result should be disregarded). 
50. Not because they urge change, but because they argue for severity. 
51. PLATO, Tm: LAws oF PLATO §§ 876d-877a (T. Pangle trans. 1980). 
